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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of offshore financial centers (OFCs). Since OFCs
are likely to be tax havens and money launderers, they encourage bad behavior in source countries.
Nevertheless, OFCs may also have unintended positive consequences for their neighbors, since they
act as a competitive fringe for the domestic banking sector. We derive and simulate a model of a
home country monopoly bank facing a representative competitive OFC which offers tax advantages
attained by moving assets offshore at a cost that is increasing in distance between the OFC and the
source. Our model predicts that proximity to an OFC is likely to have pro-competitive implications
for the domestic banking sector, although the overall effect on welfare is ambiguous. We test and
confirm the predictions empirically. OFC proximity is associated with a more competitive domestic
banking system and greater overall financial depth.
Andrew K. Rose
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1. Introduction 
  Offshore financial centers (OFCs) are jurisdictions that oversee a disproportionate level 
of financial activity by non-residents.  Financial activity in OFCs is usually dominated by the 
provision of intermediation services for larger neighboring countries.  In this paper, we ask two 
distinct questions concerning the causes and consequences of OFCs.  First, why do some 
countries become OFCs?  Second, what are the consequences of OFCs for their neighbors?
1  
What makes a country likely to become an offshore financial center?  We approach this 
question with both bilateral and multilateral data sets.  Using bilateral data from over 200 
countries in the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), we examine the determinants 
of cross-border asset holdings for 2001 and 2002 using a gravity model.  We confirm these 
results using a probit model applied to a multilateral cross-section of over 200 countries for the 
same time period.  Unsurprisingly, tax havens and money launderers host more assets and are 
more likely to be OFCs.  These results are intuitive; one attraction of moving assets offshore is 
the ability to pursue activities that are prohibited in source countries. 
Do OFCs make bad neighbors?  One might expect proximity to an OFC to be bad for the 
neighborhood, since OFCs encourage tax evasion and other illegal activities.  However, the 
presence of nearby offshore financial centers may also have beneficial effects.  Most 
importantly, the presence of an OFC with an efficient financial sector may increase the 
competitiveness of a source country’s banking sector, though this benefit is tempered by 
transactions costs.  The tradeoff between the positive and negative externalities of OFCs lies at 
the heart of our paper. 
To analyze this tradeoff, we develop a model where OFCs have this benign effect, even 
though shifting assets offshore is costly.  In our model a home country monopoly bank faces a   2
competitive fringe of OFCs that survive by offering tax advantages, subject to a fixed cost of 
moving assets offshore.  We use the model to examine the impact of OFC proximity on the 
distribution of assets between the home country bank and the OFC.  In general, proximity to an 
OFC has ambiguous effects on welfare and asset distribution.  When we simulate our model, we 
find that OFCs have strong pro-competitive effects on the domestic banking sector.  We then 
take the predictions of the model to the data, and examine the impact of OFC proximity on 
banking-sector competitiveness and financial depth.  We robustly confirm the prediction that 
OFCs have a pro-competitive impact on their neighbors.  Proximity to an OFC also has a 
positive effect on financial depth.   
To summarize, we find that countries identified as tax havens and money launderers are 
likely to be OFCs, encouraging tax evasion and nefarious activity in neighboring source 
countries.  Nevertheless, OFCs still provide substantial offsetting benefits in the form of 
competitive stimulus for their neighbors’ financial sectors.  This benign impact on local banking 
conditions tends to mitigate the adverse effects of OFCs on tax evasion and illegal activity. 
  The next section analyzes OFC determination, using both bilateral and multilateral data 
sets.  Section 3 develops a theoretical model of OFCs that compete with a domestic monopolist 
bank by providing tax benefits.  Simulations of the model allow us to gauge the offsetting effects 
on assets and welfare; these predictions are tested in section 4.  The paper concludes with a brief 
summary. 
 
2. Determinants of Offshore Financial Centers 
  The costs of shifting assets offshore have fallen over time; but they remain non-trivial.  
Why do assets get shifted offshore?  More generally, why do offshore financial centers exist?    3
We begin our study by showing that OFCs are created to facilitate bad behavior in source 
countries such as tax evasion and money laundering. 
The small literature of relevance leaves little doubt that offshore financial centers 
encourage tax evasion.  Indeed, in their survey of OFC activity Hampton and Christensen (2002) 
use the terms tax haven and OFC interchangeably; see also Masciandaro (forthcoming).  
Recently, steps have been taken to mitigate the opportunities for tax evasion afforded by OFCs.  
In 2000, the OECD identified over thirty countries as engaging in harmful tax evasion practices, 
including countries such as Andorra, Bahrain, Cook Islands, and Dominica.  Countries on the list 
were given deadlines to change their policies and avoid sanctions.
2  Most nations complied with 
the OECD.
3  The G7 has also pursued initiatives against money laundering practices, including 
the creation of a Financial Action Task Force.
4  Hampton and Christensen (2002) predict that 
such initiatives will eventually erode OFCs’ advantages and push capital back “onshore.”  Still, 
the facilitation of tax evasion remains one of the most obvious determinants of OFC status. 
 
2a. A Bilateral Approach to Cross-Border Asset Holdings 
We begin by taking advantage of the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) 
data set.  This data set is useful for studying the generic behavior of cross-border asset holdings.
5  
While there is no special place for offshore financial centers in the data set, all the conventional 
OFCs are included in the data set (more on this below).  This data set has its flaws; for instance, 
certain areas (e.g., Aruba) have a large number of missing entries.  Still, investigating these 
bilateral asset stocks seems a good place to begin identifying why assets are held overseas, the 
essential feature of offshore financial centers.  This data set has been used by a number of other 
scholars, including most prominently Lane and Milesi-Ferretti.
6   4
The CPIS data are freely available at the IMFs website at year-ends for 2001 and 2002.
7  
In particular, we use Table 8, which provides a geographic breakdown of total portfolio 
investment assets.  These data form a bilateral matrix; they show stocks of cross-border holdings 
of assets, measured at market prices.  Thus, one can determine that e.g., at the end of 2001, 
Argentine residents were reported to hold $29 million in total portfolio investment assets in 
Austria. 
  Since the CPIS data set is bilateral, it is natural to use the well-known “gravity model” of 
trade as a baseline.  The gravity model explains activity between two countries as being a 
positive function of the economic masses of the countries, and a negative function of the distance 
between them.  Variants of gravity models have been widely used in the literature by e.g., 
Alworth and Andresen (1992), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), and Portes and Rey (2005).  In 
practice we use population and real GDP per capita to proxy economic mass, and great-circle 
distance and a few other measures to proxy economic distance.  After controlling for these 
influences, we then investigate whether there is any additional role for institutional measures. 
  We use CPIS data for both 2001 and 2002.  We drop a few insignificant areas because of 
data difficulties.
8  We are left with a bilateral data set with data from 69 source and 222 host 
countries.
9  (A list of the countries is provided in appendix table A1.)  We then merge in a host of 
bilateral variables taken from the gravity literature in international trade.  These include: source 
and host country population and real GDP per capita (both taken essentially from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators).  We also include colonial history, geographic features, 
and measures of bilateral distance, common language, and common currency.  The latter data are 
mostly taken from Glick and Rose (2002).  Further details and the datasets are available online.   5
  To all these conventional variables, we add three sets of additional variables.  First, we 
add dummy variables for source/host countries that are tax havens and/or money launderers.
10  
For the former, we combine three indicators on tax havens, provided by the OECD, CIA, and 
Hines and Rice (1994).
11  For the latter, we use the June 2000 OECD Report from the Financial 
Action Task Force on Money Laundering.
12  Second, we add variables (again, for both source 
and host countries) that measure the rule of law, political stability, and regulatory quality.  These 
are continuous variables (where higher values better governance), and are taken from 
“Governance Matters III” by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003).
13  Third, we add variables 
for the legal origins (of both source and host countries), focusing on countries with legal origins 
in common, civil, and French law.
14 
  We estimate the following equation:  
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where i denotes the source country, j denotes the host, t denotes time, ln(.) denotes the natural 
logarithm operator, and the variables are defined as: 
 
•  Xij denotes cross-holdings from i held in j, measured in millions of dollars, 
•  D is the distance between i and j, 
•  Y is annual real GDP per capita in dollars, 
•  Pop is population, 
•  Cont is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border,   6
•  Lang is a binary “dummy” variable which is unity if i and j have a common language and 
zero otherwise, 
•  CU is a binary variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t, 
•  ComCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were both colonized by the same 
country, 
•  Col is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are colonies at time t, 
•  Island is the number of island nations in the pair (0, 1, or 2), 
•  Landl is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair (0, 1, or 2), 
•  Area is the area of the country (in square kilometers), 
•  Taxh is a binary variable which is unity for tax havens, 
•  Moneyl is a binary variable which is unity for money-launderers, 
•  Rule is a measure of the rule of law, 
•  Pol is a measure of political stability, 
•  Reg is a measure of regulatory quality, 
•  Common is a binary variable which is unity for common-law countries, 
•  Civil is a binary variable which is unity for civil-law countries, 
•  French is a binary variable which is unity for French-law countries, 
•  β is a vector of nuisance coefficients, and 
•  εij represents the omitted other influences on bilateral exports, assumed to be well behaved. 
 
  We estimate this equation with conventional OLS, using a robust covariance estimator to 
handle heteroskedasticity, adding year-specific fixed effects.  Rather than drop the observations 
for which the stock of cross-holdings is zero, we substitute a very small number for zero (and the 
occasional negative) values.
15  The coefficients of interest to us are {γ}. 
  Our baseline results, excluding the institutional variables, are tabulated in the extreme left 
column of Table 1.  The model delivers sensible estimates.  For instance, higher population and 
GDP per capita in either the source or host countries encourage greater cross-holdings.  Second, 
geography matters, in the sense that more distance between the two countries lowers cross-  7
holdings, while a shared land border, language, or money raises them.  All these effects are 
sensible, economically large, and statistically significant at conventional significance levels.  
Further, the model fits the data well, accounting for over half the variation in an essentially 
cross-sectional data set.  The results also seem robust to splitting the data into individual years, 
and to dropping the zero values of the regressand (these sensitivity checks are tabulated in 
successive columns). 
We then add institutional details in the fifth column.  The coefficients are collectively 
significant and have sensible interpretations.  Host countries that are tax havens and/or money 
launderers are more likely to attract cross-holding; comparable source country effects are present 
but smaller.  Neither the rule of law nor the political stability of host countries seems to be 
relevant.  But politically unstable countries and those with a strong rule of law are both more 
likely to send funds overseas.  Finally, while regulatory quality in the source country has little 
effect on cross-holdings, host countries with higher regulatory quality are much more likely to 
attract assets.  All this make sense. 
Finally, in the last column (on the extreme right) of Table 1 we add dummy variables for 
the legal origins of both source and host countries.  These are of only minor relevance.  
Common- and civil-law countries are more likely to be the source of cross-holdings; countries 
with French law are less likely to be hosts. 
We take two primary results from the bilateral sample:  First, geography plays a 
significant role in the determination of cross-border flows, even after conditioning for other 
factors that may be correlated with distance that could affect cross-border flows.  While a role 
for geography would be obvious in the case of flows of goods, the role of distance in asset flows 
is less obvious, but appears to be important in the data.  Second, identification as a tax haven or   8
money launderer is associated with an increase in cross-border flows, suggesting that the desire 
to circumvent local taxes or other local laws plays a role in the decision to move assets offshore.  
Both of these considerations are addressed in the model introduced below. 
 
2b. Multilateral Evidence on Offshore Financial Center Determination 
We now corroborate our key findings from the bilateral CPIS data set with a multilateral 
approach.  In particular, we test for the importance of e.g., being a tax haven, using the common 
law, or having political stability on the likelihood of being an offshore financial center. 
Our multilateral approach is cross-sectional in nature.  Since we are interested in 
determining which countries have chosen to become OFCs, it is important first to identify the 
OFCs themselves.  Rather than develop our own methodology to identify OFCs, we gather these 
data from three basic sources (which have considerable overlap).  We use the dummy variables 
indicating either “Financial Centre with Significant Offshore Activities” or “Major Financial 
Centre with onshore and offshore activity” from Report of the Working Group on Offshore 
Centres of the Financial Stability Forum.
16  We also include “Countries and Territories with 
Offshore Financial Centers” from Errico and Musalem (1999).  Finally, we include 
“International and Offshore Financial Centers” from IMF (2004), whether “Contacted – Module 
2 Assessment” or “Contacted under the FSAP”.
17  We further impose the requirement that the 
OFC host at least $10 million in total assets, and that it not be an OECD country.
18  This delivers 
our default set of forty OFCs, which are listed in appendix Table A2.  As can be seen from the 
table, OFCs are clustered regionally; notable groupings are in the Caribbean and Europe.  
Consistent with our results, they tend to be clustered around places with high taxes and a high 
demand for nefarious financial activity.
19   9
Our default set of OFCs is a 0/1 binary variable; a country either is or is not an offshore 
financial center.  To check the robustness of our results, we also construct a continuous variable.  
This is derived by combining the three dummy variables above with two others.  The first is a 
dummy that is one if and only if the CIA mentions that the country is an “offshore financial 
center” in its discussion of illicit drugs in the World Factbook.
20  The second is derived by 
aggregating (across source countries) the residuals from the default pooled model of Table 1.
21  
We then combine the variables by using the first principal factor from the five underlying 
variables.
22  This gives us a continuous version of our default binary variable.  The two variables 
are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is .84).
23 
We gathered data on 223 countries (listed in appendix Table A3), including our default 
set of forty OFCs.  We use data averaged from 2001 and 2002, both to smooth the data and to 
stick as close to our bilateral data set as closely as possible.  We condition on the natural 
logarithms of both population and real GDP per capita throughout (again, taken mostly from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators).  We then sequentially add: a) dummy variables 
for tax havens and money launderers, b) the three institutional measures (rule of law, political 
stability, and regulatory quality), and c) the three legal regimes.  In panel A of Table 2 we use 
our default dummy variable measure of OFCs, estimated using probit.  Panel B is the analogue 
that uses OLS (with robust standard errors) on our continuous measure of OFC activity. 
The most striking results in Table 2 are in column (2), where we consider the first two 
institutional features: tax haven and money laundering status.  Being either a tax haven or a 
money launderer has an economically and statistically strong effect in raising the probability of 
being an OFC.
24  This confirms our findings from the bilateral results that sinful countries are 
strongly associated with offshore financial centers.  On the other hand, our other measures of   10
institutional quality and the legal regime have no strong consistent effect on OFC determination.  
Conditioning on population and GDP per capita seems to have little consistent strong effect. 
We have engaged in extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the determination of 
OFCs; part of it is reflected in Table C.  This shows the results of adding ten different variables 
to the specification of column (2), which includes tax haven and money laundering status.  Two 
estimates are supplied: the middle column is the result of adding the variable to the probit 
estimation for the default binary measure of OFCs, while the right column tabulates the OLS 
coefficient from adding the variable to the continuous OFC specification.   
We have successively added: a) a dummy variable that is unity if the country is English-
speaking; b) the official supervisory power aggregate from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001)
25; c) 
a dummy variable for the presence of capital controls taken from the IMFs Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions; d) the corporate tax rate, essentially taken 
from Ernst & Young
26; e) the country’s average Polity IV score
27; f) average openness, the ratio 
of exports plus imports to GDP, taken from the WDI; g) the UNDPs human development index
28; 
and lastly h) measures of political rights, civil rights, and freedom, all provided by Freedom 
House.
29  None of these variables are consistently strongly tied to our measures of OFCs despite 
our best attempts.   We also tabulate the p-values for the joint significance of two sets of dummy 
variables: a) a set of regional variables; and b) a set of variables for colonial history (so that the 
British variable is unity for all ex-British colonies, and so forth).  We have also experimented 
with a large number of other variables with a similar lack of success.
30 
  Our most robust results from our probit estimation mirror those of the bilateral sample 
above.  The main characteristics of those countries identified as offshore financial centers are 
identification as either tax havens or money launderers.  This corroborates the bilateral results   11
from section 2a; a primary motivation for investors in moving assets offshore is circumvention of 
domestic tax laws or other illegal activities.  None of this seems terribly surprising to us; OFCs 
seem to facilitate bad behavior.  The more interesting question is whether they also provide 
positive externalities as well; we now turn to that issue. 
 
3. Consequences of Offshore Financial Centers 
  The evidence presented in section 2 indicates that tax havens and money launderers are 
likely to be offshore financial centers.  OFCs offer the advantage of e.g., lower taxes to domestic 
investors that can bear the costs of shifting assets.  That is, they compete with the domestic 
banking sector.  While OFCs lower the costs of unsavory practices such as tax evasion, they also 
provide a benefit in the form of competition for the domestic financial sector.  We now develop a 
model that focus on the tradeoffs that OFCs present for source countries.
31 
 
3a. A Simple Theoretical Model of OFC Activity 
  We assume that the domestic (source) country is populated by a continuum of depositors, 
indexed by i=1…m.  Depositors are endowed with initial wealth, w(i). We number the depositors 
such that the initial wealth of depositor i is less than or equal to the initial wealth of depositor 
i+1.  Depositors allocate their wealth to maximize their after-tax income.  They can hold three 
assets: onshore deposits; offshore deposits; and an outside alternative.  All the assets we consider 
below are risk-free. 
We assume that the alternative asset (perhaps a government bond) yields an exogenous 
rate of interest; r* is defined as one plus the interest rate on this asset.  We define rH as one plus 
the contractual rate of interest paid by the domestic bank on deposits and rO as one plus the   12
offshore contractual rate of interest on deposits.  Since depositors allocate their savings to 
maximize disposable wealth, each faces two arbitrage conditions, one for offshore deposits and 
one for home deposits.   
  We assume that there is a fixed cost, denoted ax, of making an offshore deposit, where a 
is a constant and x represents the “distance” from the home country to the offshore country.  This 
is modeled as an “iceberg” cost that melts away with offshore financial activity.  This cost can be 
offset by the tax advantage of offshore deposits, since we assume that offshore deposits are taxed 
at a lower rate than the true tax rate.  Onshore deposits, by way of contrast, are less costly but are 
taxed at a higher rate. 
If a representative depositor i places his deposits in the offshore bank, his final after-tax 
wealth satisfies() ( ) 1 O rwi a x τθ −− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , where τ  represents the nominal domestic tax rate and θ  
is a parameter representing the tax advantage of the offshore nation, () 11 / 1 θ τ ≤ ≤− .  It follows 
that depositor i will prefer to place his funds in the offshore bank relative to the risk free asset if 
and only if 








≥  (2) 
The smaller are a, x, and r*, the more likely that depositor i is to take his assets offshore rather 
than place them in the risk-free asset; ditto the larger are θ, rO, and w(i).  We define i* as the 
depositor that satisfies (2) with equality, i.e. as the depositor who is indifferent between taking 
assets offshore and placing them in the risk-free asset.  Since w(i) is positively monotonic in i, 
(2) shows that all depositors 
* ii >  will also take their assets offshore. 
   Alternatively, suppose that depositor i places his deposits in the domestic bank.  We 
model this as a monopoly; an extreme assumption to be sure, but one that allows us to focus on   13
the competitive effects easily (an alternative derivation using the assumption of a 
monopolistically competitive domestic banking sector is provided in the appendix).  The 
depositor’s final wealth earns a return of ( ) 1 H r τ − .   Thus depositors prefer the home bank if 
*
H rr ≥ .  We demonstrate below that the profit-maximizing deposit rate for the home monopolist 
bank is when this condition just binds, i.e. 
*
H rr = .  It follows that when condition (2) holds with 
equality, depositor i is indifferent between taking his assets offshore and holding them in the 






Lw i d i =∫  (3) 
 
Borrowers in the model are assumed to obtain funds from banks under standard debt 
contracts, taking the home-country demand for loans as given.  Borrowers are indifferent 
between bank sources, so a single lending rate will prevail in the home country.  Let R represent 
one plus the contractual interest rate on lending.  We assume that R is decreasing in aggregate 
lending, L, which is the sum of home bank lending, LH and offshore bank lending, LO, where 
'0 R < , and  "0 R < . 
The offshore bank acts as a competitor and a Stackelberg follower.  The offshore bank 
faces diseconomies of scale in lending because of the fixed cost of moving assets offshore.  The 
minimum interest rate consistent with any value of 
* i  is that which induces all depositors 
* i  and 
greater to take their assets offshore.  Having exhausted this segment of the population, however, 
the offshore bank can only further increase its deposits by attracting depositors that are less 
wealthy.  The fixed cost of moving assets offshore bites these poorer depositors more intensely, 
as the fixed cost is spread over a smaller deposit.  As a result, the offshore bank must offer a   14
greater premium over the domestic risk free rate to increase its deposits.  This effectively results 
in an upward-sloping supply of funds facing the offshore bank. 
Taking domestic lending as given, the offshore bank raises deposits at rates where (2) is 
binding and issues loans until it satisfies its zero profit condition 
 
  ( ) ( )
** * wi R rwi a x θ = + . (4) 
 
 
  Totally differentiating (4), the comparative static relationship between  O L  and  H L  
satisfies 



















Equation (4) demonstrates that lending by the domestic bank crowds out lending by the 
OFC.  However, note that  /1 OH dL dL <  , which implies that crowding out is less than one for 
one, so that an increase in  H L  increases overall lending levels. 
  We next turn to the lending decision of the home country bank.  The domestic bank acts 
as a profit-maximizing Stackelberg leader.  It takes in deposits equal to  H L , which results in an 
end-of-period liability of  H H rL .  Domestic profits are equal to 
 
  [ ] H H R rL π = −  (6) 
 
   15
  As profits are decreasing in  H r , it follows that the profit-maximizing decision of the 
home country bank entails setting 
*
H rr =  and maximizing with respect to the choice of  H L .  By 
the envelope theorem, the first-order condition of the home country bank satisfies 
 
 
* '0 H Rr R L − +=  (7) 
 
 
  Equations (4) and (7) form a system of equations in two unknowns,  H L  and 
* i .  In the 
appendix, we conduct some comparative static exercises to evaluate the properties of the model.  
We demonstrate that an increase in the OFC tax advantage, θ , increases offshore lending,  O L , 
and reduces home country bank lending,  H L , but less than one for one, resulting in an increase in 
overall lending.  We also demonstrate that OFC lending is decreasing in distance to the home 
country,  x.  We again find a crowding out effect, as decreased OFC distance reduces home 
country lending, but again by less than the primary effect of increasing lending by the OFC.  
Effectively, proximity to the OFC increases the competitiveness of the domestic banking market.  
We take the latter result to the data below. 
An alternative strategy for the home country bank to the interior solution above is to 
“limit-price” by issuing sufficient loans that the OFC can not compete in the home market.  By 
(4), the home bank can limit-price by issuing an amount of loans that satisfies 
 








≤  (8) 
 
   16
  Satisfaction of equation (8) with inequality implies that the OFC would lose money upon 
entry.  Note that as x (the distance between the OFC and the home country) grows, (8) implies 
that the domestic loans necessary to achieve limit-pricing becomes arbitrarily small.  Indeed, it 
may fall below the pure monopoly solution for the home country bank in the absence of the 
OFC, which is the solution to (7) given  0 O L = .   
  It follows that as x increases from 0, the solution for the home country bank passes 
through three distinct ranges:  First, it follows the interior solution to (7), competing head-to-
head with the OFC.  As distance between the OFC and the home country grows further, the 
home bank switches to the limit pricing strategy in (8).  Finally, when the OFC is sufficiently 
distant, the limit pricing solution falls below the monopoly optimum, which is the level of  H L  
that satisfies (7) conditional on  0 O L = , and the domestic bank switches to the pure monopoly 
solution.  These transitions are illustrated in our simulations below. 
  Finally, we turn to the question of the impact of the OFC on home country welfare.  We 
assume that taxes are redistributed lump sum, so that home-country welfare is invariant to the 
level of government revenues.
32  Home country welfare can therefore be measured in terms of 
the net gains from intermediation relative to placing all deposits in the alternative asset.  This is 
the sum of borrower consumer surplus, home bank profitability and depositor revenues, net of 
taxes and the cost of moving funds offshore. Adding these together and simplifying yields: 
 




WR r d l m i a x =− − − ∫  (9) 
 
 
  Equation (9) demonstrates the welfare tradeoff associated with proximity to an OFC. On 
one hand, the OFC induces the home country bank to behave more competitively, increasing   17
lending and overall welfare.  On the other hand, depositors are partially motivated to take their 
funds offshore for purely redistributive reasons, in particular to lower their taxes.  While the 
redistribution does not affect welfare, the resource cost of moving those assets offshore is a 





To gauge the impact of the OFCs’ proximity and tax advantage on overall activity in the 
home country, we now simulate the model.  For simplicity, we model w(i) as a linear function, 
setting w to an exogenous constant.  We also assume that the domestic interest rate is a 
(negative) linear function of domestic lending, L that satisfies 
  ' R RR L = +  (10) 
 
where R  and  ' R  are constants  0 R > ,  '0 R < .   
  Given these assumptions, we derive the expressions for (4) and (7) in the appendix.  This 
yields a system of two equations in two unknowns, LH  and i*.  The solution allows us to 
determine both the equilibrium loan rate and aggregate welfare. 
  We parameterize the model by setting the return on the alternative asset r* equal to 1.2.  
We set the tax advantage of the OFC, θ, to 1.2 (though we have also examined alternative values 
without any large change in results).  We set the cost of moving assets offshore, a, to 1.
33  We set 
w equal to 2 and m equal to 1.  This normalization implies that the equilibrium value of i* 
represents the share of depositors who do not take their assets offshore, as depositors 0 through 
i* leave their assets in the home country.  Finally, we normalize local interest rates by setting R  
equal to 2 and R’ equal to -0.85, although we entertain other values of  ' R  below.       18
While numerical values are a necessary part of our simulations, we concentrate on their 
qualitative results.  Figure 1 plots home-bank lending( ) H L , total lending () L , interest rates () R , 
and welfare as a function of distance to the OFC () x , for different values of  ' R .  It can be seen 
that proximity to the OFC has the pro-competitive impact that we anticipated.  It can also be seen 
that there are three distinct ranges, with discrete jumps in all values when the home bank 
switches from competing head-to-head to a limit pricing strategy.   
It is useful to consider the impacts on all of the endogenous variables as x increases.  
Beginning at x=0, we are first in the range where the monopoly bank competes with the OFC 
head to head.  As distance to the OFC increases, the home country bank expands its lending, 
taking advantage of the deterioration in competitiveness of the OFC.  Nevertheless, the increase 
in  H L  is more than offset by a decline in  O L , so that overall lending is declining.  It can be seen 
that over this range R  increases with distance, so that increased proximity to the OFC has the 
expected impact of increasing the competitiveness of the domestic banking sector.   
Note that welfare falls dramatically with increased distance within this range, even 
relative to the pure monopoly solution.  Welfare losses with increased distance come from two 
sources: the decreased competitiveness of the banking sector , and the increased cost of moving 
assets offshore. Of course, the latter eventually reduces the amount of offshore activity taking 
place.   
As  x increases beyond  LP x , the home country bank switches to a limit-pricing strategy, 
lending the amount necessary to keep the OFC out of its market.  It can be seen that there is a 
discrete increase in both home and overall lending at this point, resulting in a discrete decline in 
, R  as well as a discrete increase in overall welfare.  As  x increases within the limit pricing   19
range, overall lending and welfare decline, as the amount of home bank lending necessary to 
preclude entry by the OFC decreases. 
Finally, when  x reaches M x  the minimum level of lending to achieve limit pricing 
matches the pure monopoly solution.  At this point, home country lending, as well as the other 
variables, are invariant to further increases in x.   
 
4. Evidence on the Impact of OFCs on their Neighbors 
  We now take the theoretical predictions of the previous section to the data.  Our model 
suggests that home country bank profits are declining in proximity to the OFC, while overall 
local lending is increasing in OFC proximity.
34  Accordingly, we use our multilateral data set to 
address two questions.  First, is OFC proximity actually associated with increased domestic 
banking competitiveness?  Second, is OFC proximity also associated with greater financial 
intermediation?  We use different measures of both banking competitiveness and financial 
intermediation that are common in the literature, and control for a number of auxiliary 
explanatory variables. 
  We use the multilateral data set that we developed and employed in section 2b above.  
This is a cross-section from 2001-02 that includes 40 OFCs (tabulated in Table A2) among the 
223 countries in our sample (tabulated in Table A3).  Our measure of OFC proximity is (the 
natural logarithm of the) distance to the nearest OFC.
35  This serves as the regressor for our 
coefficient of interest. 
Our base specification conditions on the natural logarithms of both population and real 
GDP per capita, as well as a dummy variable for countries that are OFCs themselves.  In 
subsequent specifications, we add a number of additional conditioning variables to check the   20
sensitivity of our results.  These controls include dummy variables for legal regimes based on 
Civil or French Law, hours of latitude, a landlocked nation dummy variable, and the percentage 
of population that is Christian or Muslim.  Remoteness for country i is defined traditionally, as 
the average (log) distance between i and (log) GDP in the rest of the world; this variable is 
intended to serve as an indicator of overall remoteness, rather than the remoteness associated 
with distance from an OFC.
36  We also add a variable for openness, measured as total trade as a 
percentage of GDP.  We also tabulate simple bivarate regression results, without any controls at 
all (except a constant).  Finally, we provide instrumental variable results, motivated by the 
results of Table 2.  As instrumental variables for distance to the closest OFC, we use: 1) OFC 
remoteness; 2) distance to the closest tax haven; and 3) distance to the closest money launderer. 









+ + + +
+ + =
) / ln( ) ln(
) ln(min
3 2
1 0  (11) 
 
 
where the notation follows that of equation (1), and the coefficient of interest is β.   
We first test the effect of OFC proximity on domestic banking competitiveness.  Thus for 
the regressand, y, we use three measures of the degree of competitiveness of the local banking 
sector: a) the interest rate spread (loan-deposit) charged by commercial banks, b) the 
concentration ratio of the domestic banking industry, measured as the industry share accounted 
for by the top five commercial banks, and c) the number of commercial banks in a country 
divided by the log of domestic GDP.
37  The coefficient of interest to us is β1, the effect of OFC 
proximity on domestic banking competitiveness; we expect this to be positive for the first two   21
regressands (interest spread and concentration ratio) and negative for the last (banks/GDP).  We 
estimate our models with OLS/IV, employing standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. 
  Our results are shown in Panel A of Table 3.  All of our estimates suggest that OFC 
remoteness is associated with an increase in monopoly power at statistically and economically 
significant levels.  The standard deviation of the minimum distance from OFC variable is 1.07, so 
our point estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in distance to an OFC is 
associated with, e.g., between an increase of 1.41 and a 2.21 percent in the interest rate spread 
and an increase of 1.77 to 8.22 percent in the share of the banking industry controlled by the five 
largest commercial banks.  The results for interest rate spreads and bank concentration are 
statistically significant at standard significance levels when controls are included (only the 
second is clearly significant with IV).  The effect of OFC proximity on the number of banks 
(scaled by log GDP) is more marginally significant, but improves with the number of controls.   
It seems that OFC proximity is in fact associated with more competitive domestic banking. 
  We next turn to the impact of distance from an OFC on the depth of domestic financial 
intermediation.  We use three measures of intermediation commonly used in the literature: a) 
credit to the private sector, b) quasi-liquid liabilities, and c) M2, all three measures normalized 
by GDP.
38  We now expect the coefficient of interest, β, to be consistently negative, since OFC 
proximity should increase domestic financial intermediation. 
  Our results are shown in Panel B of Table 3.  The effect of distance to the closest OFC on 
financial intermediation is consistently negative.  Moreover, it is significantly different from zero 
at conventional statistical levels for two of our three proxies, the ratios of quasi-liquid liabilities 
to GDP and M2 to GDP.  Distance from OFC has a negative but insignificant effect on credit to 
the private sector as a percentage of GDP, except for the (less interesting) bivariate regression.
39    22
Again, these results are robust to a number of alternative specifications.  The point estimates also 
indicate that proximity to an OFC is consistently of economic significance.
40 
  In summary, we find evidence that distance from an OFC is associated with a lack of 
competitiveness in the local banking sector as indicated by our theory.  Moreover, financial 
depth is positively associated with OFC proximity.  While the results are not always of strong 




  This paper examines both the determinants of offshore financial centers and the 
consequences of OFCs for their neighbors.  Using both bilateral and multilateral samples, we 
find empirically that successful offshore financial centers encourage bad behavior in source 
countries, since they facilitate tax evasion and money laundering.  At first blush, it thus appears 
that OFCs are best characterized as “parasites,” since their attraction stems in part from allowing 
their source-country clients to engage in activities detrimental to the well-being of their homes. 
  Nevertheless, offshore financial centers created to facilitate undesirable activities can still 
have unintended positive consequences.  In particular, the presence of OFCs enhances the 
competitiveness of the local banking sector.  Using a model of a domestic monopoly bank facing 
a competitive fringe of OFCs, we demonstrate that OFC proximity enhances the competitive 
behavior of the monopoly bank and may increase overall welfare.  This is true despite the fact 
that deadweight losses are borne when funds are transferred offshore to an OFC.  We test these 
predictions using a multilateral data set, and show that proximity to an OFC is indeed associated 
with a more competitive domestic banking sector, and greater financial intermediation.  We 
tentatively conclude that OFCs are better characterized as “symbionts.”  23
Table 1: Bilateral Determinants of Cross-Border Asset Holdings 































































































































































































Common Law Host            .13 
(.18) 
Common Law Source            2.48 
(.34) 
Civil  Law  Host        .64 
(.20) 
Civil Law Source            2.95 
(.36) 
French  law  Host        -.48 
(.13) 
French  law  Source        .42 
(.14) 
Observations  12,220  6,364 5,856 6,063  12,220  12,220 
R
2  .56 .54 .57 .54 .60 .60 
Root  MSE  4.572 4.646 4.486 2.442 4.362 4.337 
Regressand is log of asset stocks, with 0 replaced by .0001 (except in fourth column, where 0 values dropped).   24
OLS.  Fixed year intercepts included but not recorded.  Also included but not recorded: log area source, log area 
host, landlocked source dummy, landlocked host dummy.   
Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in parentheses.  25
Table 2: Multilateral Determinants of Cross-Border Asset Holdings 
Table 2a: Dummy Variable for OFC 

















































    -.05 
(.50) 
Civil  Law      -.94 
(.60) 
French  Law      .60 
(.44) 
Observations  223 223 184 184 
Pseudo-R
2  .16 .42 .41 .44 
Regressand is dummy variable for offshore financial center. 
Constants included but not recorded.  Probit estimation; standard errors recorded in parentheses 
 
Table 2b: Continuous Variable for OFC activity 

















































    . 1 1  
(.14) 
Civil  Law      -.11 
(.13) 
French  Law      .10 
(.08) 
Observations  221 221 184 184 
R
2  .23 .58 .59 .59 
Regressand is continuous measure of offshore financial center activity. 
Constants included but not recorded.  Probit estimation; standard errors recorded in parentheses.   26
Table 2c: Potential Additional Determinants of OFC 
  Binary OFC Measure  Continuous OFC Measure 




Official Supervisory Power from 





































Regional Dummies (p-value)  .54 .08 
Colonial Dummies (p-value)  1.00  .00 
Regressors included but not recorded: log(population); log(real GDP per capita); tax haven dummy; money 
laundering dummy; intercept. 
Binary OFC measure regressand: probit estimation.  Continuous OFC measure regressand: OLS estimation with 
robust standard errors.   27
Table 3a: OFC Proximity and Domestic Banking Competitiveness 
Measure  Bivariate  Controls #1 Controls #2 Controls #3  IV 
Loan-Deposit  























# Commercial Banks  












Table 3b: OFC Proximity and Financial Depth 



































Coefficients recorded are for log distance to closest OFC. 
Controls #1: OFC dummy; log (2001-02 average) population; log (2001-02 average) real GDP per capita; intercept. 
Controls #2: controls #1 plus trade remoteness; civil law dummy; French law dummy; landlocked dummy; latitude 
in hours; % Christian; % Muslim. 
Controls #3: controls #2 plus (2001-02 average) trade as a percentage of GDP. 
IV: controls #3.  IVs for log minimum distance to OFC include: 1) log minimum distance to tax haven; 2) log 
minimum distance to money launderer; 3) remoteness from OFCs. 
OLS estimation unless labeled; robust standard errors recorded in parentheses.    28
Table A1: Host Countries in CPIS 
Afghanistan Albania  Algeria American  Samoa  Andorra 
Angola Anguilla  Antigua  and  Barbuda  Argentina*  Armenia 
Aruba* Australia*  Austria* Azerbaijan  Bahamas* 
Bahrain* Bangladesh  Barbados Belarus  Belgium* 
Belize Benin Bermuda  Bhutan  Bolivia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Botswana  Brazil  British Virgin Islands  Brunei Darussalam 
Bulgaria* Burkina  Faso  Burundi  Cambodia Cameroon 
Canada*  Cape Verde  Cayman Islands* Central  African  Rep.  Chad 
Chile*  China  Colombia*  Comoros  Congo (Zaire/Kinshasa)  
Congo (Brazzaville)   Cook Islands  Costa Rica*  Côte d'Ivoire  Croatia 
Cuba Cyprus*  Czech  Republic*  Denmark*  Djibouti 
Dominica  Dominican Republic  Ecuador  Egypt*  El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea  Eritrea  Estonia* Ethiopia Falkland  Islands 
Faeroe Islands  Fiji  Finland*  France*  French Guiana 
French Polynesia  Gabon  Gambia  Georgia  Germany* 
Ghana Gibraltar  Greece*  Greenland  Grenada 
Guadeloupe  Guam  Guatemala Guernsey* Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau Guyana  Haiti  Honduras  Hong  Kong* 
Hungary* Iceland*  India  Indonesia*  Iran 
Iraq  Ireland*  Isle of Man*  Israel*  Italy* 
Jamaica Japan*  Jersey*  Jordan  Kazakhstan* 
Kenya  Kiribati Korea* Kuwait Kyrgyz  Republic 
Laos Latvia  Lebanon*  Lesotho  Liberia 
Libya Liechtenstein  Lithuania  Luxembourg*  Macau* 
Macedonia Madagascar  Malawi Malaysia*  Maldives 
Mali Malta*  Marshall  Islands  Martinique  Mauritania 
Mauritius* Mexico  Micronesia Moldova  Monaco 
Mongolia Montserrat  Morocco  Mozambique  Myanmar 
Namibia Nauru  Nepal  Netherlands*  Netherlands  Antilles* 
New Caledonia  New Zealand*  Nicaragua Niger  Nigeria 
North Korea  Norway*  Oman  Pakistan*  Palau 
Panama*  Papua New Guinea  Paraguay Peru  Philippines* 
Poland* Portugal*  Puerto  Rico  Qatar  Réunion 
Romania*` Russian  Federation*  Rwanda  St. Helena  St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia  St. Pierre & Miquelon  St. Vincent & Gren.  Samoa  San Marino 
São Tomé and Príncipe  Saudi Arabia  Senegal Serbia  and  Montenegro  Seychelles 
Sierra Leone  Singapore*  Slovak Republic* Slovenia  Solomon  Islands 
Somalia  South Africa*  Spain*  Sri Lanka  Sudan 
Suriname Swaziland  Sweden* Switzerland*  Syrian Arab Republic 
Taiwan Tajikistan  Tanzania  Thailand*  Togo 
Tonga  Trinidad and Tobago  Tunisia  Turkey*  Turks & Caicos Islands 
Turkmenistan  Tuvalu  Uganda  Ukraine*  United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom*  United States*  Uruguay* Uzbekistan  Vanuatu* 
Venezuela* Vietnam  Virgin Islands  Yemen  Zambia 
Zimbabwe       
Note: Source countries also marked with an asterisk.  29
Table A2: Offshore Financial Centers: Default Definition 
Caribbean 
Aruba Bahamas  Barbados  Belize 
Bermuda  Brit. Virgin Islands  Cayman Islands  Costa Rica 
Dominica  Neth. Antilles  St. Kitts & Nevis  Turks and Caicos Is. 
United Arab Emir.       
 
Europe 
Andorra Cyprus  Gibraltar  Guernsey 
Isle of Man  Jersey  Liechtenstein  Malta 
Monaco      
 
East Asia 
Hong Kong  Macau  Malaysia  Marshall Islands 
Philippines Singapore  Thailand   
 
Middle East 
Bahrain Israel  Kuwait  Lebanon 
Oman     
 
Other 
Liberia Mauritius  Morocco  Panama 
Russia Uruguay       30
Table A3: Countries in Multilateral Data Sample 
Afghanistan Albania  Algeria  American  Samoa  Andorra 
Angola  Anguilla  Antigua & Barbuda Argentina  Armenia 
Aruba Australia  Austria  Azerbaijan  Bahamas 
Bahrain Bangladesh  Barbados  Belarus Belgium 
Belize Benin Bermuda  Bhutan  Bolivia 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  Botswana  Brazil  British Virgin Islands  Brunei Darussalam 
Bulgaria Burkina  Faso  Burundi Cambodia  Cameroon 
Canada  Cape Verde  Cayman Islands  Central African Rep.  Chad 
Chile China  Colombia  Comoros  Congo 
Cook Islands  Costa Rica  Cote d'Ivoire  Croatia  Cuba 
Cyprus Czech  Rep  Denmark  Djibouti  Dominica 
Dominican Rep  Ecuador  Egypt  El Salvador  Eq. Guinea 
Eritrea  Estonia  Ethiopia  Falkland Islands  Faeroe Islands 
Fiji Finland  France  French  Guiana French  Polynesia 
Gabon Gambia  Georgia  Germany,  West  Ghana 
Gibraltar Greece  Greenland  Grenada  Guadeloupe 
Guam Guatemala  Guernsey Guinea  Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana Haiti  Honduras  Hong  Kong  Hungary 
Iceland India  Indonesia  Iran  Iraq 
Ireland  Isle of Man  Israel  Italy  Jamaica 
Japan Jersey  Jordan  Kazakhstan  Kenya 
Kiribati Korea  Kuwait Kyrgyz  Republic  Laos 
Latvia Lebanon  Lesotho  Liberia  Libya 
Liechtenstein Lithuania  Luxembourg Macau  Macedonia  (FYR) 
Madagascar Malawi  Malaysia  Maldives  Mali 
Malta Marshall  Islands  Martinique  Mauritania  Mauritius 
Mexico Micronesia  Moldova  Monaco  Mongolia 
Montserrat Morocco  Mozambique  Myanmar  (Burma)  Namibia 
Nauru Nepal Netherlands  Netherlands Antilles  New Caledonia 
New Zealand  Nicaragua  Niger  Nigeria  Niue 
North Korea  Northern Mariana Islands  Norway  Oman  Pakistan 
Palau Panama  Papua  New  Guinea  Paraguay  Peru 
Philippines Poland  Portugal  Puerto  Rico  Qatar 
Reunion Romania  Russia  Rwanda San  Marino 
Sao Tome and Principe  Saudi Arabia  Senegal Serbia/Ex-Yugoslavia  Seychelles 
Sierra Leone  Singapore  Slovakia  Slovenia  Solomon Islands 
Somalia  South Africa  Spain  Sri Lanka  St. Helena 
St. Kitts & Nevis  St. Pierre & Miquelon  St. Lucia  St. Vincent & Grens.  Sudan 
Suriname Swaziland  Sweden  Switzerland  Syria 
Taiwan Tajikistan  Tanzania  Thailand  Togo 
Tonga Trinidad  &  Tobago  Tunisia  Turkey  Turkmenistan 
Turks and Caicos Islands  Tuvalu  UK  US Virgin Islands  Uganda 
Ukraine  United Arab Emirates  United States  Uruguay  Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu Venezuela  Vietnam Western  Samoa  Yemen 
Zaire Zambia  Zimbabwe       31
 Appendix 1: A Monopolistically-Competitive Model 
  In this appendix, we examine a monopolistically-competitive domestic banking sector.  
We make the same assumptions concerning domestic depositors and the offshore bank, so that 
equation (4) still represents the zero-profit condition for the offshore bank.  
To introduce monopolistic competition, we assume that there are a large number n of 
homogeneous monopolistically-competitive banks who paid a fixed entry cost, c.  The 
representative domestic bank takes  , n   k l  ( ) kj ≠ , and  O L  as given and faces an individual 
downward-sloping demand curve    R , which is assumed to be more elastic than the overall 
demand curve faced by the offshore bank, i.e.    '' R R > .  Moreover, the elasticity of demand 
faced by the representative domestic bank is assumed to be an increasing function of n; the 
greater is n, the greater is the capacity to improve market share from local rivals.  
Representative bank profits satisfy 
    () ( )
* ,1 jjj O j R nl n l L r l π ⎡⎤ =+ − + − ⎣⎦  
The representative bank maximizes its profits with respect to its choice of  j l .  The first-
order condition of the representative domestic bank satisfies 
    () ( )   * 1' 0 jk O j Rl n l L r Rl ⎡⎤ +− + − + = ⎣⎦  
  In equilibrium, all domestic banks are assumed to be identical, and the overall demand 
curve is assumed to be the same as that faced by the offshore bank, so that the first order 
condition becomes 





Rw i d i n l rR l
⎛⎞
+ −+ = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∫    32
  It is convenient to rewrite the zero profit condition for the offshore bank in terms of 
individual domestic bank lending levels and n: 





wi R wid i n l rwi a x θ
⎛⎞
+ −− = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∫  






R w i di nl r l c
⎡⎤ ⎛⎞
+ −= ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ∫  
  The last three equations form a system in three unknowns, 
* i , n, and l : 
 








'' ' ' ' / 0 0
00 '' '
w R r wi R wi Rn wi Rl wi R a di
d
wi R Rn R Rl R n d l
dx
dn wi Rl R r Rn l Rl
θθ θ θ
θ
⎡⎤ −− ⎡⎤ − ⎡⎤ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎡⎤ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ −+ + ∂ ∂ = ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ −− + ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 
  The determinant of the system satisfies: 
 
() ()   ( )
  ( ) () ( ) ()
**
2 ** * *
'' '
'/ ' ' '
D w R r Rl Rl R r
R n w Rr Rr R n l w i RRr
θ
θθ
⎡⎤ =− − − ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −∂ ∂ − − + − − ⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 
 Since    '' R R >  by assumption, ( )
* '0 Rr R n l − +<  by the domestic bank’s first order 
condition.  A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for signing the determinant is then that 
  '/ R n ∂∂  is not too large.   
The comparative statics for a change in  x then satisfy: 
    () () ()  
*
** 1
''' ' / 0
di
aR l Rr R l Rr R n lRn
dx D
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =− −− − + ∂ ∂ > ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  




aw iR l R n
dx D





aw i R R l R r
dx D
⎡⎤ =− − > ⎣⎦  
Note that l  and n move in opposite directions with a change in x. For example, with closer 
proximity to an OFC, n declines as there is exit from the domestic banking sector in the face of 
heightened competition from the OFC.  However, the declines in domestic lending is partially 













  Since overall lending increases as  x declines, it is easy to show that domestic interest 
rates fall as well. 
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Appendix 2: Comparative Statics and Simulation Details for the Monopolistic Model 
1. Comparative static exercises 
We first examine the impact of changes in the tax advantage enjoyed by the OFC, which 
is proxied by changes in θ .  By equations (4) and (7), the system of equations satisfies: 
  ( ) () ()
() ()
()
2 ** * * *
*
'' '
00 '" 2 '" H HH
wR r w iR w i R wi R a d di
dx dL wi R RL R RL
θθ θ θ ⎡⎤ −− ⎡⎤ − ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎢⎥ = ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ −+ + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
  
 
The determinant of the matrix of the system satisfies: 
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2. Simulation solution 








=   
 
and by (3) OFC lending given 







Lm i =−   
 







LL m i =+ −  
 
Given the functional form for R  in (10), the equilibrium condition for OFC lending 
given  H L  in (4) satisfies: 
  ()
** * '0 wi R R L r wi ax θ + −− =   
 
By (8) the first-order condition of the home country monopoly bank satisfies 
  ()
* '' 0 H RR L r R L +− + =   
 
The above two equations form a system of two equations in two unknowns,  H L  and 
* i .   
Finally, our welfare measure satisfies 




WR r LR Lm i a x =− + −−    36
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Figure 1 






















Figure 1 plots home bank lending,  H L , overall lending,  , L  interest rate levels,  , R  and welfare as 
function of distance to the OFC,  x.   lp x  represents the minimum value of x for which the home 
country bank chooses to limit price rather than pursue the Stackelberg leader solution.   m x  
represents the minimum value of  x consistent with the pure monopoly solution.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1  We use “country” below to refer to nations, territories, colonies, and so forth. 
2 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf 
3 There were some notable holdouts; as of 2004, Andorra, Liberia, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, and Monaco 
were still listed by the OECD as pursuing harmful tax practices (OECD, 2004). 
4 More details on the FATF are available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/; see also Masciandaro (forthcoming) and 
references therein. 
5 Alworth and Andresen (1992) is an antecedent of our work that estimates the determinants of cross-country bank 
deposits using BIS data between 17 source and 23 host countries for 1983, 1986, and 1990.  They find a significant 
role for bank secrecy in attracting deposits, presumably to facilitate tax evasion and/or money-laundering.  Portes 
and Rey (2005) focus instead on equity using a bilateral panel of data between 14 rich countries (including Hong 
Kong and Singapore) from 1989 through 1996; they find a strong role for information in explaining asset flows. 
6 For instance, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) conduct an analysis that is complementary to ours.  While we both 
use gravity models, our analysis includes all assets for 2001-02 and focuses on the role of OFCs.  In contrast, they 
analyze portfolio equity for 2001 using the CPIS data set and exclude OFCs. 
7 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/geo.htm.  Further details are available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm. 
8 In particular, the CPIS data show no cross-border holdings for e.g., the British Indian Ocean Territory (Diego 
Garcia), Christmas Island, and others; we drop them from our sample.  We also drop areas with small holdings but 
other data problems, such as the French Southern Territories (Iles Crozet, Iles Kerguelen, Ile Amsterdam, and Ile 
Saint-Paul), and Niue. 
9 We use the word “country” to denote any territory or area for which we have data (of relevance); these need not be 
e.g., diplomatically recognized sovereign states with UN seats.  Thus we include: territories (e.g., American Samoa); 
physical disparate parts of  countries (e.g., Aruba); self-governing areas (e.g., Cook Islands); special administrative 
areas (e.g., Hong Kong); dependencies (e.g., Guernsey); commonwealths in political unions (e.g., Northern Mariana 
Islands); disputed areas (e.g., Taiwan) and so forth. 
10 Huizinga and Nielsen (2002) provide a related theoretical analysis of the differences between information 
provision and withholding taxes in the context of taxing interest across national boundaries.  See also OECD (2000).  
In future work it would be interesting to treat tax havens and money launderers endogenously. 
11 Further details and the underlying data themselves are available at the sources.  The OECD identifies tax havens 
on the basis of underlying policies.  For instance, pp 9-10 of the OECDs’s 2000 Report to the Ministerial Council 
Meeting Towards Global Tax Co-operation lists the four main factors that are used to 47 tax havens identified by 
the OECD: 1) low or no nominal taxes on the relevant income; 2) a regime that is ring-fenced from the domestic 
economy; 3) low transparency about the regime’s disclosure, regulatory supervision, tax details and/or application, 
and 4) no effective exchange of information.  More details are available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf.  The CIA also provides (a little) more information on its data, at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2116.html. 
12 We use the 2000 data since it was the first review by the FATF, and use jurisdictions either reviewed or reviewed 
and deemed non-cooperative countries or territories.  More details are available at 
http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/AR2000_en.pdf.   For an analysis that treats money laundering as a choice variable 
determined by the national authorities, see Masciandaro (forthcoming). 
13 http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3.html 
14 For legal origins, we start with the well-known LaPorta, López-de-Silanes, Shliefer and Vishny data set available 
at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications/LaPorta%20PDF%20Papers-
ALL/Law%20and%20Finance-All/Law_fin.xls and fill in gaps with data from the CIA, available at: 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2100.html. 
15 We use $100 in place of 0 or negative values. 
16 Available at http://www.fsforum.org/publications/publication_23_31.html. 
17 Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/2004/eng/031204.pdf 
18 The “offshore financial centers” that are caught by the latter requirement since they are OECD countries are: 
USA; UK; Austria; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Switzerland; Japan; Ireland; Australia; and Hungary.  In our analysis, 
we label these as non-OFCs, but retain the in the sample.  Of the potential OECD OFCs, we consider only 
Luxembourg to be a potentially serious issue.   40
                                                                                                                                                             
19 OFCs also tend to be largely absent from places with poor banking systems (such as Africa and Central Asia), 
consistent with the results we present below. 
20 Available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2086.html. 
21 The aggregated residual has at the top: Cayman Islands; British Virgin Islands; Netherlands Antilles; Liberia; and 
Tuvalu.  While this – and the set of countries ranked slightly lower down – makes sense, the countries at the other 
end are more suspicious.  They include: Faroe Islands; French Polynesia; Greenland; Puerto Rico; and Isle of Man.  
The last entry and a few others towards the bottom (e.g., Macau, Malta, UAE, and Aruba) make us take this measure 
with a grain of salt. 
22 Each of the five has positive factor loadings and scoring coefficients; the first factor explains essentially all of the 
variance of the five variables. 
23 The continuous variable has at the top: Cayman Islands; British Virgin Islands; Panama; Bahamas; and Singapore.  
The countries at the other end include: Faroe Islands; French Polynesia; Greenland; Martinique; and Syria. 
24 This result is consistent with the approach of Huizinga and Nielsen (2002) who treat policies like withholding 
taxes and information provision as substitute policies. 
25 The data set is available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/interest/2003_bank_survey/wb_banking_survey_032904.xls 
26 Available at 
http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/Argentina/WorldwCorporateTaxGuide/$file/WHOLE_FILE.pdf 
27 Available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/. 
28 Available at http://hdr.undp.org/docs/statistics/indices/index_tables.pdf 
29 Available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/tables.htm 
30 We have also a) redefined our OFC dummy to include the ten OECD countries sometimes as identified as OFCs; 
and b) dropped these same ten countries from our analysis.  Nothing of substance changes when we do this 
sensitivity analysis. 
31 The logic of our approach is similar to that of Claessens and Laeven (2004). 
32 One could easily imagine an extension of the model where taxes had a distortionary impact and the loss of 
revenues to the home country government resulted in higher tax rates and therefore welfare-reducing increases in 
domestic distortions. 
33 Note that the value of a effectively only determines the normalization for x (the distance parameter) as x only 
enters into the cost function in conjunction with a. 
34 Our model predicts this behavior within the range where the home country bank was not engaged in limit-pricing, 
which we perceive to be the norm. 
35 Our concentration on the nearest individual OFC is in the spirit of constant returns to scale in the banking 
technology of the OFC in our theoretical model.  We also examined the sum of distances in miles to all of the OFCs 
as a robustness check.  These results were very similar to those reported below. 
36 Thus the most remote countries are the Cook Islands, New Zealand, Niue, and French Polynesia, while the least 
remote countries are Croatia, Slovenia, Italy, and Austria. 
37 Data for local bank concentration and the number of commercial banks come from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2001). 
38 The first measure is obtained from Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and is the average over 1980-1995.  The 
latter are obtained from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001).  
39 The distance from OFC variable does robustly enter significantly as a determinant of credit to the private sector 
when the GDP per capita variable is omitted from the specification.  However, this yields a rather uninteresting 
specification because it is well-documented that GDP per capita is highly correlated with measures of financial 
depth, e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001). 
40  We have searched for a scale effect by interacting our measure of OFC proximity with the natural logarithms of 
either real GDP or the population.  However, the coefficients on these terms are consistently economically and 
statistically small and insignificant.  We have also attempt to link the Claessens and Laeven (2004) measure of bank 
competitiveness to our determinants without success.  This is almost surely a result of the much smaller sample size; 
while their Table 3 provides estimates of H-statistics for fifty countries, that is still less than a third the size of the 
sample in our Tables 3 and 4. 
41 It is possible that channels other than the pro-competitive impact stressed in our model are also at work generating 
this result.  In particular, it is possible that proximity to OFCs changes government policies towards its financial 
system, which may alter the cost of conducting intermediation for domestic banks. 